Introduction
Partly in response to a spate of well-publicized food scares, the last decade has witnessed increased public awareness of food-safety concerns. Particularly well-known food scares include: the outbreak of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), commonly known as "mad-cow" disease, in the United Kingdom; the contamination of hamburgers and apple juice with the E. coli O157:H7 bacterium; the contamination of frozen, sugared strawberries with the hepatitis A virus in the United States; the recent "mad-cow outbreaks"in Canada and the United States; and avian in ‡uenza ("bird ‡u") incidents in Asia and the United Food scares follow a very common pattern. Before the scare, consumers behave as though they are relatively indi¤erent to the hazards associated with foodborne pathogens and contaminants. But once a scare occurs, the typical response is a precipitous decline in demand, followed by a slow, and often incomplete recovery. In some instances, certain segments of the population totally shun the commodity as a result of a scare. This tendency has been repeatedly documented. For example, nearly 60% of Japanese consumers stopped eating beef after a case of BSE in Japan was reported in 2001 (USDA, 2002) . Similarly, 8% of consumers in a sample of French households reportedly stopped consumption of beef during a BSE scare in Europe (Adda, 2003) .
In an uncertain world, there are at least two possible explanations for such behavior.
The most commonly o¤ered is that a food scare fundamentally changes individual attitudes towards risk. A less-explored explanation is that food scares change individual beliefs so that the least desirable outcomes now seem much more likely than before.
Regarding the …rst, notice that in an expected-utility framework, a total avoidance of such hazards is only explainable by arbitrarily high degrees of risk aversion. Hence, a sudden shunning of a product only seems explicable by consumers becoming arbitrarily risk averse. This, in turn, suggests a fundamental change in individual attitudes towards other risks. If true, then such a change should be associated with similar changes in other risky markets, particularly if those markets are closely related to the market in which the scare occurs.
For example, a person who suddenly becomes in…nitely risk averse as a result of a food scare should also now avoid other potentially hazardous food products. We are aware of no empirical evidence that documents such behavior. Not only does this not appear to happen, but often some of the same individuals who have shunned the scare-ridden food product resume its purchases after the negative news has passed (Adda, 2003; FPI, 2004; Wall Street Journal, 2004) ). This leaves the latter explanation: a negative food incident changes consumers' beliefs, at least temporarily, about the risks associated with consumption of a food product. This paper builds an economic model of consumer choice over food products of uncertain quality. The goal is to construct a model that explains the stylized facts of food scares:
an immediate and sharp decline in consumption of the product followed by a slow and frequently partial recovery of demand after the scare passes. To do this, we use a model where individual tastes (attitudes towards risk) are not a¤ected by a food scare, but where beliefs about the state of the world re ‡ect the presence of potential Knightian uncertainty and can be in ‡uenced by the receipt of information about the presence of food scares. Consumer beliefs about uncertain food quality are represented by sets of prior probability distributions, and preferences over these sets of prior distributions are modeled using a dynamic version of Gilboa and Schmeidler's (1989) maximin expected utility (MEU) representation. Consumers update their beliefs about uncertain outcomes in response to receipt of market information using a prior-by-prior application of Bayes'Law.
Our model recognizes the potential presence of Knightian uncertainty for at least three reasons. First, unpredictable, unanticipated, and typically unprecedented food scares are, by de…nition, "...so entirely unique..." that it is not "...possible to tabulate enough like it to form a basis for any inference of value about any real probability..." (Knight, p. 226 ).
In other words, food scares re ‡ect exactly the type of uncertainty with which Knight was concerned. Second, repeated empirical validations of the Ellsberg Paradox have revealed that individuals behave di¤erently in the presence of Knightian uncertainty than in its absence.
Thus, if Knightian uncertainty is present, it should be recognized and properly modeled.
And third, we have chosen a model that, under appropriate circumstances, degenerates to expected utility if the degree of imprecision (de…ned below) is su¢ ciently small. One of the goals of our empirical modeling e¤ort is to assess that degree of imprecision for the "mad-cow"crisis in the United Kingdom.
In what follows, as a backdrop to our modeling e¤ort, we …rst present an overview of events associated with a recent food scare, the "mad-cow" crisis in the United Kingdom, and we brie ‡y relate that scare to other well-known food scares. Although speci…cs di¤er across food scares, the "mad-cow" scare appropriately illustrates the typical dynamics of a food scare. Then we develop and analyze a theoretical model that is intended to explain these typical dynamics. The model generates short-run and long-run consumption patterns consistent with those often observed following food incidents. We derive a number of comparative statics results, and then we calibrate our model with meat consumption data for the United Kingdom. The calibrated model is used to assess the importance of various factors a¤ecting food consumption behavior and some of the ambiguous comparative-static e¤ects in the theoretical model. The paper then closes.
1 The Dynamics of a Food-Scare: The UK "Mad-Cow" Crisis BSE was identi…ed as a new disease in cattle in 1986, following the death of a cow in the United Kingdom. Between 1986 and 1995, UK o¢ cials assured the consuming public that UK beef was safe to eat. It was not until the new variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease (vCJD) claimed its …rst human victim that the UK government con…rmed the link between it and BSE in March of 1996. As of August 2004, there have been 142 deaths due to the vCJD in the UK (Guardian, 2004) . Because the disease has a long incubation period, its eventual impacts remain unknown. Figure 1 illustrates the cataclysmic decline in beef and veal usage that followed the 1996 announcement. It also illustrates the eventual, partial recovery that is characteristic of food scares. Prior to 1996, UK beef consumption exhibited a de…nite quarterly pattern of ‡uctuation around a declining trend. However, immediately following the announcement of the previously unknown (and o¢ cially denied) link between BSE and its human variant vCJD, beef consumption dropped by 40% (DTZ/PIEDA, 1998).
Following the 1996 announcement, the European Union banned UK exports of beef worldwide. The ban also a¤ected export of live calves from the UK. The combined e¤ect of the fall in demand for UK beef from UK and overseas consumers, was a contraction in …nal demand for UK produced beef of 36% in real terms between March 1996 and March 1997 (DTZ/PIEDA, 1998).
The decrease in beef consumption was short-lived, however, and by late 1997 per capita consumption of beef had recovered in line with expected trends (MAFF, 2000) . During 1998 and 1999 consumption of beef was in fact above expected trends (DTZ/PIEDA, 1998; MAFF, 2000).
Shortly after its UK outbreak, the BSE scare spread to other European countries. And in 2000, another "mad-cow" scare emerged in Europe. This scare was triggered by the discovery of an infected cow in France in November 2000, and it was most pronounced in France and Italy. French beef consumption decreased by more than 35% (Setbon et al., 2005) . In the same month, there was a signi…cant increase in the number of BSE cases registered in France.
In reaction to these French cases, beef expenditure in Italy decreased by 32.2% while prices decreased by 0.7% (Mazzocchi, 2004) . The scare in Italy was exacerbated by the detection of the …rst BSE case in a native-born cow in January 2001. Beef consumption following this discovery was 49.2% lower than in January 2000 (Mazzocchi, 2004) . A slow recovery started in late Spring 2000, but was still far from complete at the end of 2001 (Mazzocchi, 2004 ).
The …rst case of BSE outside of Europe occurred in Japan. On September 10, 2001, it was publicly announced that a dairy cow from Chiba Prefecture had tested positive for BSE. Nearly 60% of Japanese consumers stopped eating beef, but by mid-2002, Japan's beef consumption had recovered to within 10-15 percent of its pre-BSE levels (Carter and Huie, 2004 ).
Each BSE scare was characterized by a sharp initial decline in consumption followed by a gradual recovery to the pre-scare consumption levels (as adjusted for previously existing trends). This type of behavior is routinely manifested after a food scare. For example, immediately following the heptachlor contamination of milk in Oahu, Hawaii in 1982, the estimated loss of projected Class I ( ‡uid) milk sales was 29%, but …fteen months later sales had almost completely recovered (Smith et al., 1988) . Other highly-publicized food scares icantly larger responses corresponding with prominent food safety events, but these larger impacts are short-lived with no apparent food safety lagged e¤ects on demand." Sociological studies also recognize that food scares exhibit this speci…c pattern. Beardsworth and Keil (1996) classify public reaction in …ve steps with the last two steps being avoidance of the suspect food item and a gradual decrease of public concern as attention switches from the issue, leading to the gradual recovery of consumption.
The Model

Timing and Overview of the Model
We consider a two-period model, t 2 f1; 2g ; with a decision-maker choosing a two-good consumption bundle under uncertainty. The timing is as follows. In period t, the decisionmaker observes a realization of signal 2 = fN; Sg; where N stands for the absence of food scare ("no scare") and S for "food scare": After learning the signal, the decision-maker updates her beliefs about the set = fb; gg which captures all possible events relevant to the decision-maker's ex post utility. Upon updating her beliefs, the decision-maker allocates a …xed amount of income, I t ; between goods x and y; with their respective period-t prices given by q t and 1: The consumption of y involves no uncertainty about the consumer's health, and so we refer to y as 'safe'. x; on the other hand, is of uncertain quality. It can be either 'bad', denoted by b; meaning that the consumer consumes a foodborne disease or contaminant, or it can be 'good', denoted by g; meaning that x does not contain any contaminant. The set of states of Nature in each period, t; is, thus, given by :
The world is uncertain so that the odds of di¤erent states of nature are not known with precision: The decision-maker's beliefs in each period are characterized by a set of probability distributions over . The set of probabilities over is given by : By assuming that the belief structure is the same in both periods, we also assume that the realizations of signal and event in period 1 are not informative about the likelihood of their realizations in period 2: Hence, updating in response to the receipt of a signal about food quality occurs within periods but not from period to period.
The decision-maker is assumed to have a variation of recursive MEU preferences (Epstein and Schneider (2003)), where conditional preferences have Gilboa and Schmeidler's (1989) maximin expected utility (MEU) form,
Here u t denotes the decision-maker's period-t ex post utility. Beliefs are updated by a priorby-prior application of Bayes law.
We specify the decision-maker's preference functional in more detail after we have introduced its di¤erent components. However, it is important to notice that the MEU form implies that the decisionmaker is pessimistic in the following sense. When evaluating stochastic outcomes, he or she always uses probabilities that yield the lowest possible expected utility over P:
Beliefs
The prior (in the beginning of each period t 2 f1; 2g) information structure is represented by a convex set with its elements being 2 2 probability matrices
Here p ( 2 ; 2 ) and " are constants that satisfy 0 < p
These conditions ensure that each element P of is a proper probability distribution: Notice that in our speci…cation, the decision-maker's beliefs about the simultaneous occurrence of signal N and event 2 are given by a unique probability p N ; which is a …xed number.
In contrast, when " > 0; the decision-maker's beliefs about the simultaneous occurrence of signal S and event b (event g) are given by the interval p The probabilities in can be thought of as representing at least two factors: the decisionmaker's information on the possible probability distributions and his or her degree of con…-dence in the existing theories surrounding these probability distributions. This interpretation of beliefs can be traced back to Ellsberg (1961) . So, for example, if there are several competing hypotheses about the stochastic structure that characterizes the food-borne hazard, but the decisionmaker is convinced that only one is truly valid, then would be a singleton.
Conversely, if the decisionmaker had no con…dence in any of the theories the set could be quite large. Parameter "; which measures the length of the interval which the decisionmaker will entertain as possible probabilities of the presence of foodborne contamination, will be referred to as measuring the decision-maker's degree of imprecision in what follows.
Notice that the prior probability of signal realization is P 2 p ; which is independent of ": Hence, our model assumes that there is no prior uncertainty about the signal-generating process. The decision-maker, however, does have uncertain prior beliefs about the possible presence of foodborne hazards (i.e., events in ); which in both periods are given by the convex set
In each period, the realization of signal is used by the decision-maker to update her beliefs. In a risky decision environment, Bayes law is almost always used to update beliefs.
For uncertain decision environments, however, there is less unanimity about updating, and a number of alternative rules have been considered. We adopt a prior-by-prior Bayesian The posterior probability of event conditional on signal for probability matrix P is
For in (1); the sets of posterior probability distributions over conditional on the realization of signals N and S are given by 2
respectively. Thus, following receipt of signal N; the set of posterior probability distributions over is a singleton, so that receiving signal N resolves all uncertainty (but not the risk)
in the period it is received. In contrast, uncertainty remains if a food scare occurs.
Ex post Utility and Habit Formation
Ex post utility in period t = 1; 2 depends on the consumption of good x in the current and the previous periods, the consumption of good y in the current period and on the realization 1 Epstein and Schneider (2003) demonstrate that, when conditional preferences satisfy axioms of the (static) MEU model, dynamic consistency in the sense of Machina (1989) is equivalent to the rectangularity of the set of priors and prior-by-prior Bayesian updating. It is straightforward to verify that belief structure is rectangular in the sense of Epstein and Schneider.
of uncertainty 2 : Period-1 and period-2 ex post utility of the decisionmaker take the following forms:
and
where x 0 denotes the initial consumption stock of good x, x i (y i ) denotes consumption of good x (y) in period i = 1; 2, is a constant in the interval (0; 1); and r (r b ; r g ) is a random variable with r b = 0 and r g = 1: Preferences exhibit constant absolute risk aversion in the current period consumption of the uncertain good with equalling the (constant)
Arrow-Pratt degree of absolute risk aversion.
Preferences depend on the consumption of good x in the current and the previous periods because consumers exhibit habit formation in the unsafe good x. Hence, current period utility depends not only on the current consumption of good x but also on the discounted consumption in the previous periods. It is easy to verify that
that is, increases in the past consumption of x increase the marginal utility of the current consumption of x in the event = g. We also have that
The Decision-maker' s Conditional Preference Functional
After observing realization 2 fN; Sg of the signal in period 1, the decision-maker updates her beliefs about the likelihood of events in = fb; gg and subsequently chooses consumption levels of goods x and y, denoted by x 1 and y 1 ; respectively. (Here, subscripts always refer to time periods, and superscripts always refer to the signal received.) The consumption decision in period 2 depends, among other things, recursively on the consumption of good x in period 1, which, in turn, depends on the realization of the signal in period 1. In period 2, the decision-maker observes realization In Appendix A it is shown that the decision-maker's preference functional V S conditional on receiving signal S in the beginning of period 1 can be written as
where 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor. The objective function conditional on receiving signal N in period 1 has a similar form and is presented in Appendix A. Expression (4) demonstrates an especially important characteristic of our model. By (4) ; it is apparent that consumers only use the "most pessimistic" probability of the food product being safe in evaluating its consumption. This fact greatly facilitates the analysis that follows.
Preliminary Theoretical Analysis
We …rst analyze the e¤ect of changes in the model parameters on the optimal consumption of the unsafe good conditional on receiving signal 2 fN; Sg in the …rst period. We have:
2 ) conditional on either realization of the signal (8 2 fN; Sg) satis…es:
1. Period-1 consumption x 1 conditional on signal is strictly decreasing in period-1 price (q 1 ) and the discount factor ( ): It is increasing in the initial consumption stock (x 0 ); and Our main objective is a model that explains the stylized facts of a food scare. A robust empirical observation is that food scares (here receipt of signal S) decrease consumption of x. If consumer beliefs are "su¢ ciently imprecise", our model predicts just such a decrease.
The following proposition makes precise the intuitive statement "su¢ ciently imprecise":
consumption following a food scare in period 1 is strictly lower than in the absence of a food
The condition in Proposition 2 requires that the posterior probability of the food product being uncontaminated in the absence of a food scare be greater than the most "pessimistic" posterior probability of it being uncontaminated in the presence of a scare. Because our decisionmaker evaluates "post-scare"consumption of the food product in terms of this most pessimistic probability, the condition requires that the decisionmaker e¤ectively believes that food contamination is more likely in the presence of a scare than in its absence. Intuitively, receiving a "scare" signal process must be truly informative about the possible presence of foodborne contamination if consumers are to react to it by decreasing consumption of the hazardous food product.
It is of particular interest to note that even if there is no food scare in period 2, period-2 consumption conditional on the occurrence of food scare in period 1 is strictly smaller than period-2 consumption conditional on the absence of food scare in the previous period 
> x
SjS 2 ). Thus, the model predicts that if a scare signal is followed by receipt of a "no-scare" signal the process of recovering from the scare, which is manifested in real-world experience, commences.
Another stylized fact of food scares is that following a scare, some segments of the population completely shun the potentially hazardous food product. Proposition 1, where it was shown that x S 1 and x Sj 2 are strictly decreasing in "; suggests (but does not imply) that refusal to consume the food product may occur if there is su¢ cient imprecision: In fact, it can be shown that when an individual's beliefs are extremely imprecise (as seems natural for most unprecedented food scares), he or she will not consume the hazardous food following a food incident. In Appendix D, we show that there exists a threshold level of "; " t < p 
Intuitively, extreme imprecision is associated with the case where the receipt of a scare signal convinces the decisionmaker that the posterior probability of eating contaminated food approaches zero. Or put another way, the decisionmaker e¤ectively treats receipt of a scare signal as con…rming the presence of foodborne contamination.
The prior probability of receiving signal S (the prior probability of a food scare) also plays an important role in determining whether an individual will completely shun the food product of uncertain quality following a food scare. In particular, in our model, consumers are more likely to shun the product if a food scare is a low probability event. We have:
Proposition 3 When the probability of food scare is su¢ ciently small, the decision-maker does not consume the hazardous food following a food scare. Speci…cally, there exists a threshold level t 2 ["; 1] of the probability of signal S such that x Appendix E shows that low-probability food scares result in almost complete posterior uncertainty so that following a food scare the range of posterior probabilities of a bad food outcome covers almost the whole probability interval [0; 1]: The pessimistic MEU maximizer acts as though the bad health outcome were almost certain. As a consequence, he or she refuses to consume the food product of uncertain quality. Thus, scares are more likely to have drastic consequences for consumption of the hazardous food product if prior to the receipt of the signal the decisionmaker was e¤ectively anticipating receiving a signal that the food product would be …t for human consumption. Scares have bigger consequences for consumption patterns when they are unanticipated probabilistically than when they are perceived as relatively frequent occurrences.
Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we calibrate our model using data on beef and veal consumption in the United Kingdom that covers the "Mad-Cow" crisis of the 1990s, and use the calibrated model to investigate quantitatively the degree of imprecision that is consistent with the calibrated model, and how that measured degree of imprecision responds to di¤erent assumptions on model parameters.
The period in the model is half a year. Period 1 is the …rst half of 1996 while period 2 is its second half. The discount factor for half a year is set to = 0:99; which is in line with so that our quantitative analysis takes the prior probability of a "scare" signal emerging as
.01, and the prior probability of no-scare as :99: Given that many, if not most consumers,
were likely unaware of the potential link between BSE and vCJD prior to its report and the relatively advanced stage of meat processing technology in the United Kingdom, we actually believe that this prior probability of a scare is, in fact, quite high. One of the goals of the quantitative analysis is to determine how altering the prior probability of a scare a¤ects our quantitative results. Notice, in particular, that we have explicitly assumed that posterior probability of the food item being dangerous to health given the presence of a food scare,
is greater than the posterior probability of it not being hazardous. In this sense, we are assuming that the scare signal in question is informative.
The values of the remaining parameter values are summarized in Table 1 . Apart from the discount factor, the degree of habit persistence, and the degree of absolute risk aversion, these values re ‡ect the situation in the UK immediately prior and immediately after the revelation of the BSE-vCJD link. 2 We would like to thank the authors for giving access to their paper. Given our parameters, the models solves for the factor w by which we normalize prices, the prior and posterior degrees of imprecision " and consumption in period 2 following scares in periods 1 and 2 (x SjS 2 ). We take x SjS 2
to be counterfactual to our data
In Figure 2 we depict the posterior degree of imprecision given by
and how that measured degree of imprecision responds to changes in the degree of absolute risk aversion. The …rst thing that we note is that the posterior degree of imprecision is quite large, and that it tends to grow as the postulated level of risk aversion increases in what can be thought of as plausible ranges for risk aversion, but that once assumed risk aversion reaches implausibly high levels of risk aversion the degree of imprecision starts to decline.
This pattern of behavior is explained as follows. It is quite well known that it is generally impossible to disentangle uncertainty aversion (here referred to in terms of imprecision) from risk aversion without very speci…c assumptions on models. More generally, the same model can be interpreted as either perfectly uncertainty averse or perfectly risk averse.
When consumers become very excessively risk averse, their behavior becomes extremely conservative and manifests a "safety-…rst" type of decision process. They will not expose themselves to any perceived risk even if the prior probability of that risk is arbitrarily low.
Hence, one expects that e¤ects that might otherwise be attributed to imprecision would in the limit be captured by the extreme risk aversion, and measured precision would decline as we observe here. We emphasize, however, that our quantitative results suggests that this only occurs at levels of risk aversion that are well above commonly accepted values.
We have also solved for x We have also investigated the impact on the posterior degree of imprecision and x SjS 2 as the probability of the food scare tends to zero. The limiting behavior of the posterior degree of imprecision as a function of the probability of food scare when the latter tends to zero was identi…ed in Proposition 3 (see Appendix E for the formal analysis). The quantitative results suggests that similar behavior is exhibited even in nonlimiting cases. Table 2 uniformly decreases as the prior probability of a food scare declines. Although we have no …rm evidence upon which to base it, our strong conjecture is that a priori most food scares are extremely low probability events. We base this conjecture on the fact that the risks involved in many of the most famous food scares were simply not anticipated by the consuming population before the food-scares occured. Therefore, if individuals would have been asked to attach a prior probability to such an event occuring, it seems plausible that that probability would have been extremely low. Table 2 shows that when the prior probability of a scare is quite low, our data suggests that consumers exhibit a high degree of imprecision a posteriori. Because a high degree of posterior imprecision implies very conservative behavior on the part of consumers in response to the food scare, their natural reaction to a food scare is to avoid the commodity in question, just as happened in the UK beef and veal markets as well as in other markets where there have been serious food scares.
Concluding Remarks
We have built an economic model of consumer choice over food products of uncertain quality. Speci…cally, our results suggest that consumers perceive a substantial degree of post-scare uncertainty (posterior degree of imprecision exceeding 14% in the baseline case), and that that degree of imprecision uniformly increases as the prior probability of a food scare declines.
Because we conjecture that the prior probability of a food scare was likely quite low, we also conjecture that our results may understate the true degree of posterior imprecision that consumers faced.
Appendix A Conditional Preference Functionals:
Let the posterior probability of event conditional on the observation of signal for probability matrix P be denoted by j : Denote the sets of posterior probability distributions over conditional on the realization of signals N and S by respectively.
The decision-maker's preference functional conditional on receiving signal in the beginning of period 1 can be written as bjS exp 3   7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  5 where 2 (0; 1) denotes the discount factor.
Using (1), (2), (3) and condition P 2 P 2 p = 1, the objective function conditional on receiving signal S in period 1 can be written as (4) . Similarly, the objective function conditional on receiving signal N in period 1 can be written as Proof. The …rst-order derivatives of V S with respect to the choice variables are given
The second-order derivatives of V S with respect to the choice variables are given by:
The Hessian matrix is given by H 2 6 6 6 6 6 4 : One can verify 
(8), (9), (10), (14) and (15) imply that V S is strictly concave in (x Proof. Di¤erentiating (5), (6) and (7) with respect to " we obtain
Di¤erentiating (5), (6) and (7) with respect to q 1 and q 2 we obtain
From (11), (12), (13), (16), (17), (18), (19) and (20) it follows that V S is supermodular in 2 ) is strictly decreasing in "; q 1 and q 2 : To prove monotonicity of the conditional preference functional with respect to parameters x 0 and , we will invoke the Implicit Function Theorem. Di¤erentiating (5), (6) and (7) 
Di¤erentiating (5), (6) and (7) with respect to and evaluating the derivative at the optimal (x 
Strict concavity of V S and V N combined with (26) and (27) 10 Appendix E Proof of Proposition 3: Consider the di¤erence between the largest and the smallest probability of event 2 fb; gg conditional on S Note that " is the smallest permissible (by conditions imposed on ) value of probability of signal S: We have that
That is, as probability of S gets arbitrarily close from above to "; the posterior degree of uncertainty associated with both b and g tends to 1: Since the degree of uncertainty is equal to the di¤erence between the upper and the lower probabilities, following a food scare with a su¢ ciently small probability the range of probabilities of an adverse outcome covers almost the whole probability segment [0; 1]: Since the decision-maker's preference functional is continuous in the conditional probabilities, he/she will shun consumption of the hazardous food. 
